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EXTREMISM BEHIND BARS

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About the authors



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of security staff in the area of extremism and radicalization in prisons. For more than 20 years, he worked as a member of the Prison Service of the Czech Republic, of which 17 years at the Prevention and Complaints Department in the Kuřim Prison. Subsequently, he worked in the Světlá nad Sázavou Prison, where he was in charge of investigating complaints of convicts or the third parties acting on convicts' behalf. He also dealt with issues concerning criminal activity of employees of the Prison Service of the Czech Republic (until 1 January 2013, the date of the establishment of the General Inspectorate of Security Forces); after that, he focused on the criminal activity of imprisoned persons. He is also a member of RAN (Radicalization Awareness Network – section Prison & Probation) and a member of EENeT – European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues. In the past, he also worked as a lecturer in the educational project of the Ministry of the Interior: SK-EMICVEC- Manifestations of Extremism in Cyberspace. He repeatedly worked as a consultant on prison issues in Afghanistan. He specializes in the topics of extremism and radicalization in the prison environment and in society, and is a co-author of an analytical tool for monitoring manifestations of extremism and radicalization in prison facilities.



Preface

In the last twenty years or so, the topic of radicalization has become important and has begun to be reflected both in research and on a practical level. The al-Qaeda terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 was the starting point for stronger interest in the subject. On the one hand, this attack accelerated radicalization research; on the other hand, this attack negatively affected research, which focused predominantly on religiously motivated radicalization as a result of the activities of Islamist terrorists. This trend continued for years; it was later intensified by the rise of the so-called Islamic State, whose members and supporters of its ideas began to attack various targets around the world.

At this level, the second decade of the 21st century is characterized by the establishment of a number of research projects and teams that deal with radicalization in different regions and environments. New psychological and social areas of knowledge regarding radicalized individuals, or individuals at risk of radicalization, are developing. There are many theories explaining radicalization. On a practical level, new approaches to dealing with such people, methods of preventing them from being radicalized, making them socialize and reintegrating them into the majority society come to light. Greater and more stable attention is paid to the support and training of first-line practitioners, i.e., people who come, within the performance of their work, into contact with people at risk of radicalization or with people who are already part of extremist movements or identify with them

ideologically. First-line practitioners include social workers, probation officers, educators, psychologists, security forces and prison staff.

The prison environment is, in a way, atypical and interesting; in the context of radicalization, it is more than appropriate to deal with this environment separately due to its unique characteristics. It is an environment in which frustrated, isolated, negatively socialized and stigmatized individuals, often prone to violence, are concentrated. It is an environment in which power is exercised and power is enforced. In such an environment, the possibility of radicalization naturally increases. At the same time, the following should also be noted: due to the polarization of society and the various crises modern society is facing, the number of prisoners convicted of terrorist acts, hate crimes, etc. has been growing in Europe for a long time, according to Europol. The number of convicts with an extremist background is becoming significant.

For these reasons, it is fortunate that this publication has been written. It provides a comprehensive view of the issue of radicalization and imprisonment. The book is beneficial for several reasons: It develops this issue in the Czech context; it is necessary to emphasize that the topic of radicalization in prisons has been a neglected topic in the Czech environment. It brings specific Czech experience (in fact, experience from the Central European area, which is also missing in the relevant literature), placing it in an international context, thus reciprocally introducing foreign knowledge to the Czech environment. Its complexity also lies in the fact that it offers theoretical perspectives and models of radicalization in the context of the prison environment and, at the same time, provides a very practical insight into the daily lives of convicts, which contributes to further understanding of

the radicalization process and the background against which this process takes place, including tattoos, symbolism and propaganda issues. In addition, this publication addresses both aspects of radicalization inside the prison and radicalization outside the prison, when radicalized individuals subsequently arrive in the prison environment. Last but not least, returning to my introductory words, the book contributes to the clarification of ideological motivations that appear in the process of radicalization. The publication is a case study of the prison environment, in which political radicalization is dominant, not religious (specifically Islamist) radicalization. The publication thus brings right-wing and left-wing extremism, which are dominant in Central Europe, back to the debate on radicalization in prisons.

Petra Mlejnková

1st Chapter

Extremism and Its Essence

Stanley Milgram: “Control the manner in which a man interprets his world, and you have gone a long way toward controlling his behavior. That is why ideology, an attempt to interpret the condition of man, is always a prominent feature of revolutions, wars, and other circumstances in which individuals are called upon to perform extraordinary action.”

The prison environment is, by its nature, a breeding ground for extreme positions – to life, values and the society. That is also why prison seems to be a breeding ground for extremism. This issue, especially the issue of violent extremism in the prison environment, has gained, in the last few years, more significant attention, not only academic but also political attention, across countries and prison systems (Hamm 2013). Given the fact that prisons are often perceived as very sensitive to any form of radicalization, academics and scientists, in general, often address challenges and opportunities that arise from the presence of extremists tending to violently manifest their beliefs in prison systems. Problems faced by prison institutions, as a result of this fact, are richly covered by relevant literature. For a long time, the publications focused mainly on understanding the risks and dynamics of the radicalization of convicts (Brandon 2009; Hannah, Clutterbuck, Rubin 2008). Recently, authors have begun to focus more on “technical” aspects of these challenges, such

as risk assessment and classification, management strategies, and rehabilitation and reintegration approaches (El-Said 2015; Silke, Veldhuis 2017). However, in order to be able to understand the dynamics of radicalization and extremism as a significant threat to the operation of (not only) prison institutions, it is essential to primarily understand the nature of radicalization and extremism. The aim of this chapter is to introduce, distinguish and analyze both of these concepts, the interpretation of which differs considerably among authors; it seems futile (and quite possibly pointless) to seek a uniform concept.

Radicalization is a term used to explain how an apparently ordinary person can be transformed from a law-abiding citizen into a supporter of violent protests. Radicalization can be encountered in many different environments, from classical physical sites such as community centres, mosques, etc., to much more abstract environments such as social networks and discussion forums. The danger of radicalization lies in the fact that radicalized individuals who are indoctrinated by extremist ideologies can, in many cases, continue to plan and carry out ground attacks individually, regardless of the organization they are considered a fighter or a member of. Examples are the perpetrators of the Madrid bombings in 2004, the London bombings in 2005 and the Boston marathon bombing in 2013. This is only a quick list illustrating this nascent phenomenon of the so-called indigenous or self-starter radicalization (Kruglanski et al. 2016).

However, in the context of the above examples, it is first necessary to explain another concept, which is terrorism. On 7 July 2005, London became the subject of a violent attack on the city's transport infrastructure during its full operation. This form of violence can be described as terrorism. Terrorism is not easy to define, as the nature of acts varies greatly, but the common

variable for these acts is the use of fear, forms of intimidation and/or violence against non-combatant, unarmed persons in order to promote social or political goals (Kruglanski, Fishman 2009). But how did London's terrorist attacks during the 21st century differ from other prominent attacks? The main difference is that the investigation revealed that the London bombings were not organized by Al-Qaeda or foreign nationals, but by three British citizens. This is an attack that highlighted a new trend of so-called homegrown terrorism. This is a clear example of domestic terrorism, which can be seen as a terrorist act coordinated and carried out from the target country (Thachuk, Bowman, Richardson 2008). Domestic terrorism also applies to Western citizens who are radicalized by foreign fundamentalist groups and subsequently perpetrate terrorist acts. Over time, terrorism began to be reconsidered; instead of being considered a purely external threat, it began to be seen as a threat from within.

The 2019 terrorist attack on the London Bridge in the United Kingdom is linked to the prison environment and the Building Bridges Rehabilitation Programme, which is a European Restorative Justice Project focusing on building bridges between offenders and victims of crime. On the London Bridge in the British capital, a terrorist performed an attack with a knife and was later shot dead by police on the spot. Five people were injured in the attack, two of whom died. The attack took place on a bridge over the Thames connecting London's City and Southwark. As early as June 2017, the bridge became the scene of a terrorist attack, which claimed eight lives here and also in the Borough Market district, which is several hundred meters away; three attackers were killed and almost fifty other people were injured. In 2019, the attacker was Usman Khan, who had been convicted in 2012 after plotting with a group from Stoke-on-Trent, London and

Cardiff. They discussed attacking the London Stock Exchange and pubs in Stoke, and setting up a jihadist training camp in Pakistan. He had been released from prison on licence in 2018, half-way through a 16-year sentence for terrorism offences. Twenty-five-year-old Jack Merritt and twenty-three-year-old Saskia Jones fell victim. Jack Merritt studied law at the University of Manchester before going to Cambridge to continue his studies. Saskia Jones was from Stratford-upon-Avon, Warwickshire, and both were involved in a university prisoner rehabilitation programme at Cambridge University (BBC 2019). The London Bridge terror attack unfolded during a conference organised by a University of Cambridge programme called Learning Together. Learning Together is a project that brings together offenders and those in higher education “to study alongside each other” in equal partnership. The design of Learning Together in England is grounded in resonances between the individual and social components of transformative learning and movements away from crime (Ludlow, Armstrong, Bartels 2019).

Education related to the performance of prisons, in the sense of joining students both from outside and from prison, in order to make these two groups study together, has a relatively long history abroad. In December 2019, my colleague Lukáš Dirga and I had the opportunity to participate, as invited guests, in the final lesson of a course organized by Hydebank Wood in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Hydebank Wood College is a prison for juvenile offenders, which involves two different parts. One part is for convicts aged 18 to 21; this part focuses on the provision of educational and employment opportunities. The other part, Ash House, is for imprisoned women, both convicted and in custody. The School of Social Sciences, Education and Social Work (SSESW), part of Queen’s University Belfast, developed a new innovative university module in cooperation

with this prison called Reintegration After Prison. Organized by the SSESW academics Shadd Maruna and Gillian McNaul, this module is part of the University of Cambridge-led Learning Together movement, which includes partnerships among prisons and universities across the UK and beyond. The Learning Together movement brings together people in criminal justice and higher education institutions in order to make them study together in inclusive and transformative learning communities. The Learning Together partnership provides higher education opportunities to enable people to study together and learn from each other through dialogue and sharing of experiences. The courses are, as for their academic level, rigorous; their design and implementation support educational, sociological and criminological research and best practices through their evaluation.

At Hydebank Wood, a number of SSESW students attend courses at this facility, along with a group of Hydebank Wood students from both the male prison (formerly known as the Young Offenders Institute; accommodation provided for those aged 18–21) and the only Northern Ireland women's prison (Ash House) based in the same place. In recent years, Hydebank Wood has become a learning centre with a range of vocational and training courses; a small number of students are already completing higher education through the so-called open university. The new Learning Together module offers students, convicts at Hydebank Wood, the opportunity to try out university-level education; the project's initiators believe that some of them will be encouraged to continue their education after their release. At the same time, SSESW students have a unique opportunity to learn about the problems of rehabilitation and reforms in a real criminal institution, and to study together with their classmates who have considerable experience which they can share. This

partnership is also an opportunity for knowledge exchange for Queen's University and the Northern Ireland Prison Service, both institutions benefitting from a collective initiative. In fact, in the final course of this module, the attack on London Bridge was mentioned, which significantly affected the project's participants. We came to understand that the context of the attack had affected the project itself and put its representatives into uncertainty about whether they could continue. Not only during the minute of silence that we held together with the university students and juvenile convicts did we have the opportunity to realize this and many more things in the presence of people who were at the scene of the attack.

Radicalization itself can be defined as a process in which an individual adopts extreme ideologies and beliefs that may (but need not) lead to extreme behaviour (McCauley, Moskalenko 2008). It is relatively common to assume that radicalization often occurs only in individuals who manifest their radicalism in extreme actions. In practice, however, radicalization may also apply to those who have been implicitly radicalized, but still show no clear evidence of radicalization at the level of external manifestations. Quite logically, this raises the greatest concerns regarding radicalization which results in acts or behaviour changes (McCauley, Moskalenko 2008). At the same time, radicalization means changes at the level of one's ideological attitudes towards pronounced positions that contradict constitutional norms, are characterized by elements of intolerance and attack basic democratic constitutional principles. Such attitudes are capable of turning into activities that have a destructive effect on the existing democratic system, including activities of a violent nature (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic 2019).

Radicalization can be seen as a process of political socialization towards extremism. Alternatively, it can be considered as a process of escalating conflicts in connection with the increased use of illegal methods of political action in confrontation with opponents. It is a process of mobilization and recruitment that is controlled by manipulative political or religious authorities. Finally, however, it can also be understood as a process of transformation, a transformation of life, that changes a personal identity focused rather on the individual into a new identity focused on the collective, thanks to which vulnerable individuals are subject to the demands of an extremist cult (Buis, Demant 2008).

The degree of radicalization can be defined as the degree of imbalance between the central goal of some extreme behaviour and other common goals that people normally have. An individual who only supports the idea of terrorism while carrying out their day-to-day tasks and, at the same time, pursues a number of their other goals is considered to be less radicalized than a person who actually joins a terrorist organization or an extremist group. A non-combatant member of a terrorist organization, an employee, an individual, whose life in the organization allows for various alternative pursuits, is less radicalized than a fighter who actually takes up arms and actively risks his/her life for his or her own or shared cause. Under these conditions and limits of definition, the most extreme radicalized individuals are considered suicide bombers ready to sacrifice everything for the given cause. This concept of radicalization in relation to its degree reflects the pyramid model of participation in terrorism (McCauley, Moscalenko 2011), in which many passive proponents of terrorism represent the broad base of the pyramid. If you move towards the top of this imaginary pyramid, you find fewer and fewer individuals ready to subject their alternative

fears to unilateral pursuit of the central goal. This notion of degrees of radicalization also applies to Sageman's (2004, 2008) fundamental question regarding its specificity: why, of the entire population, relatively few people seem to be actively involved in the struggle under the same objective circumstances. From a current perspective, the reason for this could be that only a few individuals are sufficiently committed to the central goal, thus devaluing or eliminating from their mind common alternative concerns representing basic human needs in terms of health and survival (Kruglanski et al. 2014).

The first phase of radicalization is the individual radicalization due to personal victimization. This is a key point for individuals who, for example, have been ostracized due to some specificity of theirs. Feelings of fear and isolation that (not only) convicted individuals experience lead to the fact that such victimized individuals can embark on the path of personal radicalization as a result of their perceived desire for revenge on those who have offended them, or the whole society that perpetrated this (McCauley, Moskaleiko 2008; Knapton 2014).

The second phase is very similar: individual radicalization often results from political injustices and measures taken in response to a perceived negative political trend. Both the first and the second phases may stem from exclusion. When an individual is ostracized, he/she often wants revenge or retribution from the individual or individuals who are the source of this exclusion. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that this experience can lead to individual radicalization due to victimization or political injustice (Zadro 2011).

Once a convicted individual goes through personal radicalization, he or she enters a phase where he or she often considers

joining a radicalized group. This may or may not happen. If personal radicalization is due to exclusion, the probability of joining a group is slightly higher. It is natural that individuals need to belong somewhere; they want to be part of a group, as is the case of not only radicalized individuals, but also those within the majority population. If individuals are excluded from their group, they can strive to rejoin that group. These radicalized individuals may, however, leave this organization and instead subsequently try to harm the other party (Gómez et al. 2011; Zadro 2011). Of course, there is still a need to belong somewhere, which is inherent for the human species, and therefore individuals can also look for groups which represent the cause of their ostracization. For example, Saeed (2007) states that as a result of Islamophobia, some individuals report that they rely mainly on their Muslim friends and families.

Joining a radicalized group can begin as a mere expression of interest, which, over time, may lead to the involvement of the given individual in group actions (McCauley, Moskaleiko 2008). This process may be accelerated in individuals who have recently been ostracized, as these individuals are more susceptible to social acceptance manifestations (Pickett, Gardener 2005) and more willing to join the group, albeit extreme (Williams 2007). This is the first step of the group socialization process, which refers to the phase of investigation, when individuals try to find exactly the group that meets their needs (Moreland, Levine, Cini 1993).

Subsequently, individuals undergo the socialization phase, where the new members accept and interiorize the group's standards and shared attitudes. Sensitivity to social influence can be exacerbated by the need for solidarity and the new members' cognitive deconstruction; however, one of the consequences of

exclusion is, among other things, reduced information processing capabilities due to cognitive deconstruction (Twenge et al. 2003). This is what can cause a certain irrationality, illogicality and thus greater susceptibility to social pressure in such individuals (Ball 2011; Wood 2000).

The need to belong somewhere is clearly a strong motivation for joining a group, regardless of whether the group is negatively defined or negatively self-defined. Once individuals are admitted to such groups, they adapt much more quickly to shared group standards (Gonsalkorale, Williams 2006).

When different people come together to create a group, the average opinion of the group typically shifts towards extreme opinions (Myers, Lamm 1976). In this context, this phenomenon is called group polarization. It is a social phenomenon happening in ordinary interactions people enter into. When one talks to someone about a certain issue, he/she often has, after the conversation, a changed and different opinion on the given matter, in some respects, than before the conversation. Thus, for example, if the subject matter of a group discussion is the evaluation of something specific of which the members of the group have a positive opinion, it is usual that after the discussion, their opinions are even more positive than at the beginning. It works similarly when something is discussed by people who have a negative opinion of the subject matter; after the completion of the discussion, their views regarding the matter are more negative. In both cases, the discussion participants take a more pronounced position compared to the one they had when entering the discussion. In this rather simplified way, it is possible to describe this phenomenon referred to, in social psychology, as group polarization (Výrost, Slaměnik 2008). Polarization, in general, can be understood as a kind of crystallization, for example,

within a social group; this, in turn, results in dichotomy, a certain black-and-white thinking with no interest in compromising (Hartl, Hartlová 2010). Group polarization can be understood, to some extent, as a tendency of individuals to make more extreme decisions within groups compared to their average decisions before joining a group or a group discussion, namely in the sense of radicalization of original attitudes (Isenberg 1986).

This can be especially dangerous if several individuals who have been excluded from a group come together and form a new group. After such ostracization, hatred against the group which performed the original exclusion increases. In addition, many individuals want revenge on the perpetrators of their ostracism. If individuals encounter wrongs associated with social exclusion, the decisions they make may escalate in relation to the perceived need for revenge combined with the phenomenon of group polarization (Twenge et al. 2001; Zadro 2011; Knapton 2014).

A person's actions are their own personal reaction to stimuli that they mostly receive from the external environment. When it comes to radicalization and the radicalization process, it is indisputable that such behaviour requires a number of triggers that can start not only the radicalization process, but can also deepen and intensify it. This is why radicalization is a multifactorial problem that can be viewed from different angles. However, the professional public are creating various models of radicalization; the following section focuses on the characteristics of such models. A number of various models of radicalization are distinguished, some of which this publication presents. The models presented and radicalization models in general have a number of factors in common; however, they differ from each other mainly in the understanding of the course of radicalization. While some authors view radicalization more

as the result of a combination of factors, others present this phenomenon in the form of a linear progressive process with identifiable phases (Goerzig, Al-Hashimi 2015).

Psychologist Randy Borum developed one of the first phase models of radicalization in 2003, which he published in his study *Understanding the Terrorist Mind-Set*. This model was developed for the needs of investigators and security analysts in order to meet the growing need to better predict the behaviour of extremist entities (Borum 2003). The author of the so-called Four-Stage Model originally focused on subjective thought processes of originators of terrorist acts. This particular model explains how subjective feelings of frustration (injustice, indignation, etc.) can be transformed, in an individual's thought processes, into targeted hatred, which can ultimately reach the point where the individual uses violence to present and defend his/her attitudes, opinions, etc. As for this model, it is important to realize that the model can be used not only in connection with a specific terrorist act, where all the circumstances leading to the act are subsequently investigated and identified, but it is also possible to apply this model to classical extremists who may not prefer using violence to achieve their goals. The beginning of the radicalization of an individual can be mainly seen in some exposed event which had a major impact on the further actions of the person in question and caused a situation where the person assumes that the given situation is not good, it is not right, it does not correspond to possible options, etc. This is followed by a situation where guilt is seen in the pro-active activity of someone else, some specific person who needs to be punished; this state is transferred to the next phase which clearly defines the position of the given individual to others, as the others are a necessary evil that must be defeated quite fundamentally and uncompromisingly.




Figure 1: Borum's Four-Phase Model of Terrorist Thinking
(Borum 2012: 39)

Borum's conceptual model thus attempts to explain how wrongs turn into hatred towards the target group and how this hatred transforms into a stimulus or one's own justification for violence. This is a four-phase model that begins with an unsatisfactory event or wrongdoing (*"It's not right"*) being labelled as unfair (*"It's not fair"*). The given injustice is blamed on the target person, the group, the nation (*"It's your fault"*). The responsible party is often subsequently disgraced, often even demonized (*"You are evil"*), which facilitates subjective justification or incitement to aggression.

Probably the best-known model of radicalization, quoted very often in literature, is the staircase model developed by the American psychologist Fathali M. Moghaddam, which is why it is often called the Moghaddam Model of Radicalization. This model is a bit more elaborate than the previous one and depicts

the radicalization process as a narrowing six-step staircase the goal of which is a terrorist act (Moghaddam 2005). This staircase is hypothetically divided into a ground floor and five above-ground floors. The stairs to individual floors represent psychological processes that co-create and contribute to the next movement of a person or their staying on the current floor. Moghaddam states that the stairs leading to higher and higher floors and the movement of an individual between these floors depend on various doors and spaces that the individual imagines as doors having to be opened on his/her way. The basic feature of such a situation is not only the number of floors, stairs, rooms, etc., but also the manner one perceives the building and the doors which the person thinks need to be opened. As the individual ascends the staircase, he/she has fewer and fewer options until he/she reaches only one of them, which leads to the destruction of others, himself/herself or both. The key to advancing to a higher floor is the deepening frustration of the individual and subsequent other negative occurrences with which the individual interacts and finds no solution for. On the second and the third floors, the individual gets in contact with ideology and more negative experience. If the situation does not change, the individual is convinced that the use of force, i.e. an act of terrorism or, generally, violent behaviour, is the only possible way out.

The individual stages which form the radicalization process and are metaphorically expressed by the staircase are divided as follows:

1. Psychological interpretation of material conditions;
2. Perception of the possibility of combating unfair treatment;
3. Start of aggression;

4. Moral commitment;
5. Consolidation of categorical thinking and the perceived legitimacy of a terrorist organization;
6. Terrorist act.

The staircase narrows at the exit from the ground floor. As in most well-known models, Moghaddam argues that feelings of dissatisfaction and perceived adversity of fate (framed as perceived deprivation) form the basis and fuel for the initial step on the way to extremism, or terrorism. However, fewer and fewer people rise to successive floors, so a relatively small number of people actually progress to the point where they become actively involved in extremist activities or terrorism. According to this model, people, at the beginning, have a desire to alleviate the adversity of fate and feel the need to improve their current situation. However, their unsuccessful attempts to achieve the set goal lead to frustration. Frustration evokes feelings of aggression. The escalation of anger against their enemy leads to more intense adherence to violent, extremist ideologies and groups. Some of these sympathizers subsequently join an extremist group and possibly engage in violent activities. At the imaginary peak, which represents the final level, are those who overcome all obstacles and actually commit a violent, hence terrorist, act (Moghaddam 2005; Borum 2012).

This publication presents specific models related to the radicalization process, one of which was developed for the needs of a US police force, specifically in New York, so it is represented by four letters, NYPD, the New York Police Department model. It was developed mainly to combat Islamic terrorism. The radicalization process is divided into four basic stages, and it is important to realize that an individual does not necessarily go through all the stages and does not necessarily always start in

the initial phase. This model is, in fact, a clear analogy of how the situation and the issue of the process of radicalization is viewed by the professional public in the Czech Republic. Even in this country, it is important to realize that an individual may not go through all the stages. There is undoubtedly a possibility that a particular individual may leave the whole process of possible radicalization, for example, in connection with his/her release from imprisonment. However, considerable caution is required, as the conduct of a prisoner prior to his or her own release can be entirely purposeful, with the aim of achieving the release. This means that such an individual knows what needs to be prepared and how to behave during the execution of a custodial sentence, especially in its final stages, before a conditional release hearing, etc. People who have gone through all the stages of the process are very likely to be actively involved in or will strongly support extremist/terrorist acts of violence (Silber, Bhatt 2007). This model was originally designed to help the US security forces fight terrorism (Borum 2012). However, although the model was developed primarily in relation to Islamic terrorism, it can, after modifications, be applied to violent extremism in general.

The first phase of this model is pre-radicalization. This phase describes the world of an individual in terms of his/her social background, lifestyle, religion, education, etc., in the period before the beginning of his/her way to radicalization. There is no psychological profile of a probable or “ideal” candidate for radicalization. Nevertheless, there is a match between many demographic, social and psychological factors that make some individuals more susceptible to radical positions. The demographic characteristics of a country, city or region also play a role in providing a breeding ground for the occurrence and growth of the radicalization process.

The second phase of the presented model is self-identification. This phase, which is largely influenced by both internal and external factors, marks the moment when an individual begins to discover the ideas of jihadist Salafism (or, more generally, any extremist ideology). Salafism is perceived as an inhomogeneous movement whose members hold different views regarding, for example, the issue of jihad, a term denoting the religious obligation of Muslims to strive for the spread of Islam in their own hearts and in the world, and denoting apostasy or political participation. Salafism is not a unified movement, and there is no consensus among Salafists on a binding pattern of behaviour; on the contrary, the movement holds rather intense controversy and long debates. The Salafists practically shunned active politics until the Arab Spring. Unlike Islamists, Salafists systematically refused, until 2011, to participate in politics which they saw as something that divided Muslims. As far as jihadist Salafism is concerned, some politicized Salafists and Islamists have adopted radical, violent and revolutionary attitudes due to the unfulfilled hopes of the Arab Spring, or, more specifically, the failure of political liberalization in the Arab world and the so-called counter-revolution. The original Islamist and jihadist radicals had unattainable goals, such as overthrowing their secular governments, and ousting US influence from their countries, which failed. Today's radicals are building the existing state and believe that their struggle is part of the final confrontation of good and evil, Islam and the West (Hesová 2017).

At the same time, this individual, in the second phase, is slowly deviating from his/her former identity, which is beginning to be redefined by the newly adopted philosophy, ideology and values. The catalyst of this search is often a cognitive event, or crisis, which questions the individual's certainty in previously held beliefs, and opens his/her mind to a new view of the world

or the adoption of a new religious identity in the sense of religious conversion. Individuals who are most at risk at this stage are mainly those who stand at an imaginary crossroads of their life, i.e. those who are trying to create a new identity or change the direction of their life and, at the same time, feel the need to obtain consent and confirmation for the path they choose.

The third phase is indoctrination, during which individuals' convictions are consolidated and the persons fully accept jihad-Salafian ideology. A key aspect of this stage is their adoption of a religious-political worldview that justifies, legitimizes, incites or promotes violence. As a result of the indoctrination of individuals, the direction of their life gets redefined. Indoctrinated radicals do not pursue goals of the majority, do not want to have a good job, make money or take care of their family; their goals are, on the contrary, only personal and focus on achieving the imaginary "higher good".

The last phase is jihadization. A characteristic feature is that individuals accept their individual duty to act on behalf of the thing and commit themselves to it (Silber, Bhatt 2007).

As mentioned above, this model is primarily focused on Islamic radicalization; it is, however, applicable to other manifestations of extremism, which can also play a crucial role in the radicalization process of individuals.

The author of another important model of radicalization is Joshua Sinai, who divides the process of radicalization into three phases: radicalization, mobilization and action. For the radicalization phase, Sinai identifies six groups of factors. These include personal factors, such as cognitive openness in the form of efforts to strengthen the relevant ideology, which concerns

the interests of the individual; political and sociological factors; ideological factors that are key but not sufficient alone; and finally community factors, such as the presence of extremist subcultures within the local community. Group factors cannot be omitted, for example, the presence of an extremist “gate”; it is also important to consider factors that provide opportunities and means to become extremists.

The next phase of this model, mobilization, is reached when certain catalysts drive vulnerable individuals who are not delayed by inhibitors further down their path. Sinai describes the active phase of mobilization as a phase that consists of three main components, which are opportunity, ability and readiness to act on behalf of the group.

The final phase is the action phase of selecting a target and carrying out an attack (Sinai 2012, Schmid 2013).

An important one is Wiktorowicz’s model, which introduced the concept of cognitive opening, a moment when an individual who sought to make sense of their existence suddenly sees a kind of imaginary light and exchanges their old worldview for the one he/she considers truer (Wiktorowicz 2005; Schmid 2013). This model places more emphasis on the role of social influence in the process of radicalization of individuals. It consists of four key processes that increase the likelihood that an individual will be attracted to a radical group and subsequently gain the belief that it is necessary to actively participate in it. These processes are cognitive opening, religious search, framing and socialization. Cognitive opening means that an individual begins to better notice new possibilities and new views of the world; in the process of searching, the individual seeks some meaning through a certain framework (in the original concept of

the model, this was a religious framework). Framing is a process in which the depiction of the facts offered by a radical group makes sense to the individual in question, and attracts his/her interest. Finally, socialization is a process where relevant interpretations facilitate the individual's indoctrination, forming his/her identity and changing his/her values (Temple-Raston 2011).

Finally, the most elaborate visualization of the issue is provided by the already mentioned pyramid model of political radicalization. This model approaches the process of radicalization in a similar way as the model created by Moghaddam. However, this model views individuals and their thinking processes in a different way, dividing the degree of radicalization: from the most frequent sympathizers, who are at the very base of the pyramid, to the most active individuals, who are at the very top of the pyramid. At the same time, this model deals with their possible interrelationships. The most numerous group includes individuals who accept and sympathize with the goals that are offered and presented to them by relevant extremist organizations or individuals. The other group is still relatively large, but no longer reaches the size of the basic group. This group supports the goals that the extremist organization has set itself as goals it wants to achieve, and uses violent ways to achieve them. Another group could be called the recruiting group, as its main task is to gain new members and supporters who will be willing to help achieve the goals in whatever manner. In addition, this recruitment group may perform other activities that consist of financial assistance to the organization, logistical assistance, etc. At the very top of the pyramid are people who actively participate in achieving the goals, so they are the very actors of extremist or terrorist attacks.




Figure 2: Pyramid model of radicalization (Muro 2016)

The pyramid-shaped model emphasizes that this is a gradual and increasing process. The pyramidal model points out three different dimensions, which are the individual dimension, group dimension and societal dimension. From the pyramid's point of view, radicalization is a gradient that distinguishes active extremists/terrorists from the broader base of sympathizers. An interesting aspect of this model is that it deviates, to some extent, from the individual level and introduces the role of some kind of frameworks that connect terrorists with their societies as a whole. In order to understand militants, it is important to pay attention to identifying the group or the way in which terrorists care about what happens to the group, especially in relation to other groups (McCauley, Moskalenko 2008).

Although the field of radicalization research has been increasingly influenced, over time, by research into social movements

and political violence, it has gradually developed into an independent research sector (Abay Gaspar et al. 2020). European researchers have been researching the issue of radicalization for at least as long as American researchers, and often with a greater sense of urgency. In a qualitative report commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Justice, Precht (2007) summarized the broad outlines of radicalization as follows: *“Radicalization often begins with individuals who are frustrated with their lives, society, or the foreign policies of their governments. A typical pattern is that these individuals meet other like-minded people and go, together, through a series of events and phases that may eventually result in terrorism. However, only a few of these eventually become terrorists. The rest of them stop or abandon the radicalization process at various stages.”*

Within the concept of radicalization, it is also possible to distinguish between three basic forms of radicalization, namely radicalization into violence, radicalization within violence and radicalization without violence. Radicalization into violence refers to a somewhat conventional understanding of radicalization where an individual or a collective expand their means so as to achieve their goals. They are willing to use violence, which, in itself, is a rejection of legal ways. Violence is not used as a form of self-defence, but is considered a (often political) tool to prevent alleged injustice (Balluch 2011). Radicalization within violence refers to individuals who are already actively using violence and becoming more radicalized. This may be accompanied by an increase in the means of violence, the frequency of acts of violence or the expansion of their goals. By shifting strategies, an individual or a group can try to escape a conflict or gain more attention in order to gain supporters, support, and legitimacy. Radicalization without violence, as a category, concerns both individuals and groups who seek to achieve their goals by explicitly

non-violent means, but deliberately violate the framework of the current legal system in order to express a growing tendency to reject the current order. Radicalization without violence can be seen wherever there is a distinction between the level of attitudes and the level of actions. An example is the conceptual difference between the so-called cognitive radicalization and violent radicalization (Vidino 2013) or behavioural radicalization (Neumann 2013). Adherence to radical beliefs does not require participation in radical actions. That is also why radicalization, as a process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs, must be distinguished from action paths, i.e. from the process of engaging in terrorism or violent extremist actions (Borum 2011; Fishman 2010; Abay Gaspar et al. 2020).

At present, there is no globally recognized theory that can, without exception, explain all cases of individuals in the process of radicalization. However, it is possible to build on existing theories that allow us to uncover the imaginary curtain and, at least partially, understand why the phenomenon of violent radicalization occurs, or how individuals in whom radicalization occurs specifically differ from the majority population.

One of the interesting theoretical frameworks that can be applied to understanding radicalization processes and violent extremism is Social Movement Theory (Gunning 2009). Social Movement can be defined as a set of opinions and beliefs in a population that represents a preference for changing elements of the social structure and/or rewarding the division of society (Zald, McCarthy 1987). Experts who dealt with the issue of Social Movement Theory came up, in the 1980s and 1990s, with the idea that the main task of any organization or movement is to survive. This requires members or supporters to collectively associate and retain a number of supporters. Their possible loss must

be supplemented, and more members must be added in order for the movement to grow, as it is its growth that is necessary to expand the influence and capacity of the movement. This is a completely different concept from the initial perception of Social Movement Theory in the 1940s, when the idea prevailed that movements arose from irrational processes of collective behaviour that took place under tense environmental conditions, which evoked a mass feeling of dissatisfaction. The expansion of the membership base and the supporter base in the 1980s and 1990s was also accompanied by the finding that members of the movement, as they sought to gain more supporters, functioned as rational prospectors. They want to be effective, so they try to identify persons who are most likely to agree, if asked, to support the matter. The recruitment process has two phases: first, these rational prospectors use information to find probable goals and then, after identifying them, offer information about participation opportunities and offer incentives to convince new recruits for the movement's cause (Brady, Schlozman, Verba 1999). The focus of Social Movement Theory has generally changed greatly over the last fifty years; the most important current influences are New Social Movement Theory, which focuses rather on macrostructural processes, and Resource Mobilization Theory, which focuses more on contextual processes, such as group dynamics (Borum 2011). Framing Theory could be considered the third significant influence within Social Movement Theory (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008). Framing Theory focuses on how movements and social collectives are constructed and how they make and spread the "sense". It is a recursive process in which ideological entrepreneurs of the movement try to formulate a message that best aligns with the interests, attitudes and beliefs of potential recruits/supporters. After people accept the movement reference frameworks, their growing identification with the collective movement is evident (Borum 2011).

The theory of social learning is also interesting. The authors of this neo-behavioural theory focused on explaining social learning through imitation. The theory of social learning understands aggressive behaviour in humans as a direct consequence of observing and imitating aggressive patterns (Bandura 1969). The application of the theory of social learning to extremism or terrorism explains violent behaviour as a certain reconstruction of the moral principles of an individual on the basis that he/she has been a direct witness to violence.

One of a number of theories is the theory of rational choice. The theory of rational choice is based on the premise that it is a well-thought-out strategy, a political tool used as opposition to the current way of governing a state. The argument that extremist or terrorist behaviour should be considered rational is based on the premise that organizations concerned have an internally consistent set of values, beliefs and ideas about the organization of society. Extremism and terrorism are seen as logical means to achieve desired goals which bring the greatest profit (Crenshaw 1981).

There is no identified pathology, either in terms of an individual's health status or psychological profile, that explains why some individuals become extremists or terrorists (Horgan 2014; Silke 1998). However, psychological factors contribute to radicalization. The strongest of these are the lack of self-confidence and sense of identity. This combination then often leads to the need to join a movement and feel valued by others. In this context, it is possible to talk about a kind of search for the "sense" (Kruglanski et al. 2014) and search for identity contributing to the feeling of solidarity, value and purpose (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008).

Social psychology brings, to the study of radicalization, a deep and long-term focus on inter-group conflicts and dynamics (Borum 2011). There are two main reasons why group dynamics have a significant effect on radicalization. The first reason is that groups satisfy individuals' psychological needs to find the "sense" and the "goal". Memberships in groups and participation in their activities correspond to the psychological search for the "sense" (Kruglanski et al. 2014). The second reason is the fact that groups increase costs associated with their members' leaving the group once they have joined it. Even if an individual loses faith in the ideology, strategy or tactics of the group, he/she cannot easily leave. Feelings of loyalty, guilt and anxiety about returning to the previous "normal" life appear (Hafez, Mullins 2015). Some individuals even fear punishment from the group. It is not impossible and often happens that if an individual leaves a group in which he/she was very intensively involved and in whose activities he/she participated, an era of social death begins for such individuals, as all their contacts are or were related to the group membership.

In addition to the psychological aspect and with regard to the future focus on radicalization in the prison environment only, socio-economic disadvantage must also be mentioned as an important aspect that can play a causal role in radicalization, often through a worsening subjective perception of injustice. This is described in the theory of relative deprivation: individuals are aware of the fact that others are better off, compared to them, that they have better material conditions or a higher social status. These differences are perceived by individuals as unfair; actually, relative deprivation can refer to both individual and group levels (Christmann 2012). Therefore, economic inequality, which can facilitate radicalization when combined with personal experience of discrimination, is also significant (Hardy 2018).

While theories that deal with psychological traits try to find personal characteristics that make an individual prefer joining extremist groups, there are theories that focus primarily on investigating urge or motivation; these theories deal with external actors/originators, i.e. charismatic leaders and radical individuals; they evaluate their role in recruiting new members to extremist groups. Researchers working in this field propose to deal with the dynamics of psychological manipulation in order to assess the process of radicalization. Trujillo et al. (2009) suggest two types of possible recruitment. The first is a kind of self-recruitment, where a group of friends radicalizes through the Internet in order to exchange knowledge and practices and strengthen ideological attitudes. Online radicalization is a much-discussed topic today, and it should be noted that it is often a one-way process, because while online radicalization is a phenomenon well described and existing, online de-radicalization is more or less not possible.

In the context of online radicalization, the terms Cyber-Terrorism or Extremism or Cyber-Racism or Cyber-Hate are also often mentioned. Online radicalization is now widespread and has become a growing concern for society, governments and security forces virtually around the world. As it turns out, various platforms on the Internet that provide minimal barriers to content publishing, anonymous environments, and access to millions of users are often misused for spreading extremist ideas. They are used for concentrating individuals within hate groups and racist communities, spreading extremist sets of issues, inciting anger or violence, promoting radicalization, recruiting members and creating virtual organizations and communities (Correa, Sureka 2013).

There are many examples of people who have radicalized themselves with the help of the Internet. Online radicalization can be

the result of exposure to extremist content. Of course, no single item of extremist propaganda guarantees the transformation of people into extremists, and therefore terrorists. Radicalization on the Internet is manifested primarily by the fact that individuals immerse themselves in extremist content for a longer period of time; the effects of graphic images and videos acting on them are intensified, and the resulting emotional anaesthesia appears (Pyszczynski et al. 2006). However, we must not forget the social environment to which people are exposed on the Internet. In the online environment, there is interactivity between members of various forums, networks, online communities, etc. Often, this interactivity makes participants in extremist Internet forums or other platforms modify their own opinions. Some of the participants get so worked up that they declare themselves ready to be terrorists. Given that this process takes place in the homes of individuals, it facilitates the emergence of domestic radicalization worldwide. When we think about online radicalization, let us keep in mind the social and interactive nature of the Internet. Cyberspace allows people to play their idealized selves and project into these the qualities and characteristics they seek but do not have (Bessière et al. 2007; Neumann 2013).

The second type of recruitment is recruitment as a result of a process of systematic controlled and conscious psychological manipulation, which is very similar to manipulation created by, for example, totalitarian or sectarian groups (Maskaliunaite 2015).

In order to understand the content of this publication, however, it is necessary to distinguish, in addition to radicalization itself, also between the terms radicalism and, especially, extremism. After all, these concepts are inextricably linked. The very history of the concept of radicalism can, to a certain extent, provide us with some guidance on what should be a defensible

understanding of the concept of radicalization. The term “radical” existed as early as the 18th century. It was often associated with the Enlightenment and also with the French and American revolutions of this period. However, it became more widespread only in the 19th century, when it often referred to a political programme promoting thorough social and political reforms. To be radical meant to represent or support the extreme part of a party. The way we perceive and define things often depends, to a large extent, on who we are, and when and where. It is important to remember that we are not all part of the mainstream; we are not all moderate, traditional, normal; we do not have the same reference point for measuring the distance between acceptable, common sense, mainstream political positions and unacceptable radical positions on the left or right or along some other political axis (e.g., ecological or religious) (Schmid 2013).

The final feature of radicalism is that it differs from the normal, ordinary, traditionally perceived worldview that prevails in every society; it is not a difference in degree, but in the concurrence of contradictions (Bittner 1963).

Probably the best-known element of the practical dimension of radicalism is Freeman’s (1975) radical flank theory. This idea was introduced as a means of referring to elements within the women’s liberation movement, whose goals differed from those held by most in the rest of the movement. Later, Haines (1984) applied this theory to radical civil rights organizations. Both Haines and Freeman believed that radical organizations and activists had a positive or negative influence on major movements or organizations by promoting greater activity than more moderate actors were willing to accept. While they may attract negative attention through extreme or violent actions carried out in favour of the movement, they may also act in a way that

Haines called a positive radical flank effect, by placing the actions of moderate organizations in a more favourable light (Cross, Snow 2012).

Separating radicalism and radicalization from related concepts, such as extremism, is an important task in order to keep these concepts analytically useful. McCauley and Moskalenko (2010) drew a distinction between activism and radicalism. They defined activism as readiness for legal and nonviolent political action, and radicalism as readiness for illegal and violent political action. This is a distinction that we can only welcome on the one hand; on the other hand, we can ask the following question: according to which standards is the dichotomy legal vs illegal assessed? If these standards are not enshrined in international human rights law, humanitarian law or international criminal law, it must be borne in mind that both authoritarian and democratic governments can create and amend national laws so that one and the same activity can, in the same place, fall either under legal activism or illegal radicalism in a relatively short period of time if a new law is introduced. Radicals are not violent as such; although they may share certain traits with (violent) extremists, there are also significant differences, for example, in their willingness to think critically. A radical attitude may not result in violent behaviour, which is a fact well demonstrated over decades of research (Schmid 2013; Bartlett, Miller 2012).

Organizations and activists are often a safe place for radicals to get together and develop and maintain at least some security culture. These environments enable the exploration and education of radical ideas and identities. In addition, these bottom-up organizations facilitate the development of friendships among activists themselves and the formation of related groups, which then facilitates more coordinated types of radicalism. Further

investigation of radicalism and radicals has the potential to provide a better understanding of these processes (Cross, Snow 2012).

While the term radicalism has existed at least since the 18th century, the term extremism has a much more recent origin. In Germany, this term did not enter the authoritative dictionary “Duden” until 1942. The post-war “Verfassungsschutz” (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, abbreviated BfV, Civil Internal Intelligence Service of the Federal Republic of Germany) began to use the term extremism in 1974. In the late 1970s, this term was first introduced as a scientific term by Manfred Funke. The term was seen as a fundamental opposition to the basic values of the West German constitution, as reflected in a number of federal constitutional court verdicts since the 1950s against the Sozialistische Reichspartei Deutschlands – SRP, Hitler’s National Socialist successor party, and the Moscow-run Communist Party (Funke 1978; Bötticher 2017).

In the Anglo-Saxon world, discussions of extremism date back to the First World War. The term “*extremite*” was used by Bishop Stephen Gardiner as early as 1546 to describe his enemies. The term was popularized by U.S. Senator Daniel Webster, who used it to describe the most violent proponents of the debate on (anti) slavery during the American Civil War. One hundred years later, the term experienced its renaissance, specifically in the 1960s. At that time, empirical approaches to better conceptualizations developed. In the 1990s, a basic theoretical framework based on ideology, narration and group thinking was developed (Safire 1996; Carpenter 1964; Metzler 1968; Mead 1971; Seymour, Raab 1970).

Extremism characterizes the ideological stance held by movements directed against the establishment. These movements see their policies as a struggle for supremacy rather than as a peaceful competition between parties with different interests, which seek general support for the promotion of the common good. Extremism exists on the periphery of society, trying to conquer its centre by evoking fear of enemies inside and outside society. Extremism divides people into friends and enemies; there is no room for diversity of opinions and alternative lifestyles. Due to its dogmatism, it is intolerant and reluctant to compromise. Extremists, who see politics as a zero-sum game, tend, as circumstances often allow, to engage in aggressive militancy, including crime and mass violence, in their fanatical will to gain and maintain political power. Where extremists gain state power, they tend to destroy social diversity, and seek to achieve a comprehensive homogenization of the society based on an often faith-based ideology with apocalyptic features. At the societal level, extremist movements are authoritarian; when in power, extremist rulers tend to be totalitarian. Extremists glorify violence as a mechanism for resolving conflicts, and oppose the constitutional state, majority democracy, the rule of law and human rights for all without distinction (Bötticher 2017).

2nd Chapter

Basic Extremist Directions

Stanley Milgram: "It is not so much the kind of person a man is as the kind of situation in which he finds himself that determines how he will act."

The issue of the impact of imprisonment on violent political extremism is the subject of numerous academic and political discussions. Some researchers, especially outside the United States, suggest a link between imprisonment and participation in violent extremism (Brandon 2009b; Mulcahy et al. 2013). Other researchers, especially those in the United States, are rather sceptical about a strong link between imprisonment and violent political extremism (Klein 2007; Jones 2014). In this context, Hamm (2009) speaks of conflicting views, dividing the research literature regarding extremism in the prison environment into two branches: a "calming" branch, the members of which conclude that there is no relationship between radical beliefs and terrorism; and supporters of the "alarming" view, who see prisons as incubators of terrorist ideology and post-release activism. However, mutual adaptation of these views is limited by at least two factors in existing research. First, only a limited amount of data regarding political extremists is available to date. And second, most studies concerning political extremism and prison issues that are available examine radicalization within prisons (Hamm 2008; Useem, Clayton 2009) or cover